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IN  RECENT  YEARS  MONETARY  POLICY  MAKERS  have  moved  far  in the 
direction of regarding  the money stock as their principal instrument. It is a 
reasonable shorthand description of this change to say that policy makers 
now control the money stock in the light of forecasts of economic activity 
and movements in interest rates, whereas before 1970 they controlled in- 
terest rates in the light of forecasts of economic activity and movements in 
the money stock. Nonetheless, the "control" actually exercised by the Fed- 
eral Reserve is not exact, whether it chooses interest rates or the money 
stock as its instrument. Between 1951 and 1970 control of interest rates was 
not exact because it was felt desirable to let market forces have a consider- 
able impact on them. Since 1970 the money stock has not been controlled 
exactly because it is deemed desirable to cushion short-run movements in 
interest rates by permitting the money stock to fluctuate around a target 
path. 
Experience  since 1970 has added an issue to the debate over the desirabil- 
ity of controlling the money stock rather  than the interest rate. This issue- 
the technical  feasibility  of controlling the money stock-is  the subject of 
this paper. Such a question has never arisen with respect to interest rates.1 
* The authors  alone share  responsibility  for all views expressed  and for any errors  of 
analysis. 
1. It should be emphasized  that this statement  refers  to short-run  periods. Interest 
rates pegged  at an unchanged  level in the long run produce  cumulative  economic move- 
ments away from equilibrium-Wicksellian cumulative movements-that  ultimately 
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The Federal Reserve can peg the rate of interest on any debt instrunment 
simply by announcing a price at which it will buy and sell unlimited amounts 
to all comers. Or, since quotations are available continuously, the Federal 
Reserve can simply enter the market as a buyer or seller whenever the in- 
terest rate deviates from the target level. The effects, for example, of a $50 
million open market purchase of Treasury bills on interest rates can be ob- 
served directly and without lag. If that purchase does not achieve the de- 
sired end, the operation can be repeated. 
Whereas interest rate control is technically relatively easy, money stock 
control is not. The money stock data are available only after a significant 
lag, and then are subject to frequent and substantial revisions. If the money 
stock of last week was deemed too  low,  it cannot be accurately known 
whether random influences are eliminating or aggravating the problem this 
week. Nor can it be known exactly how much money growth will result 
from, say, a $50 million open market purchase. 
The technical limitations in controlling the money stock are sizable but 
not enormous. At present it is surely possible (if all other considerations 
are ignored) to hit a desired level of the average money stock for a month 
with a standard error of less than  1 percent.2 The standard error of the 
change between any two months would therefore be less than 1.4 percent.3 
If the two months were a year apart, the standard error on the annual rate 
of growth would be less than 1.4 percent, but could amount to an annual 
rate of as much as 5.6 percent for the growth rate over three months. As 
this example illustrates, control over the rate of growth of the money stock 
over very short periods of time may be highly inaccurate under current in- 
stitutional arrangements. 
Three major responses to this state of affairs  may be identified. One is to 
argue that short-run variations in the rate of growth of money don't mat- 
ter anyway; with a policy of staying as close as possible to a target path for 
force the abandonment  of a fixed peg. But the possibility  of a Wicksellian  cumulative 
movement,  although  relevant  to the wisdom  of pegging  the interest  rate in the short run, 
seems irrelevant  to the feasibility  of doing so. 
2. At current  levels of the money stock (Ml definition,  that is, demand  deposits plus 
currency),  1 percent  equals about $2.4 billion. A monthly money market  model devel- 
oped at the Federal  Reserve  Board  has a demand  deposit  equation  with a standard  error 
of $0.591 billion and a currency  equation  with a standard  error  of $0.093 billion. 
3. Assuming the errors  on the two monthly levels are statistically  independent,  the 
standard  error  of the change between  the two months  equals  the square  root of the sum 
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the money stock, the actual rate of growth will, over a year or two, be very 
close to the target rate. 
A  second response argues that the policy makers should abandon at- 
tempts to control the money stock and instead aim at a variable that really 
can be controlled, such as some other aggregate like the monetary base or 
unborrowed reserves, or else some interest rate. 
A third response is the search for better control methods that could nar- 
row the deviation between the actual and target levels of the money stock. 
This paper develops the third type of response. In analyzing the technical 
problems of controlling the money stock and making proposals for dealing 
with them, we assume the desirability of improving monetary control. The 
case for better monetary control is no more closely related to monetarist 
doctrine than is the case for improving the governmental budget process to 
fiscalist doctrine. In fact, of course, those who view technical problems of 
monetary control as serious also tend to assign less importance to mone- 
tary policy and to  give greater weight to  the objective of stable interest 
rates, while those who downplay such problems tend to take the opposite 
positions.  Whatever the  relative importance assigned to  monetary and 
fiscal policy, we believe it is important that all policy instruments be con- 
trolled as precisely as possible. 
The topic of the next section is the theoretical importance of accurate 
monetary control. The basic question analyzed is, In what ways are errors 
in achieving a desired level of the money stock costly? The answer is that 
imprecision in monetary control tends to magnify fluctuations in both in- 
come  and interest rates, and perhaps also to  increase the likelihood  of 
policy errors. 
Since errors in reaching money stock targets impose stabilization costs, 
it is natural to look for methods to improve monetary control. This paper 
concentrates almost exclusively on technical problems of control. Virtually 
no attention is paid to the important question of the appropriate definition 
of money. Although demand deposits plus currency-M  -is  the definition 
of money used here, it will often be obvious how the choice of a different 
definition would affect the reform proposals. Nor is there an examination 
below of the possible side effects, such as those on bank competition and the 
efficiency of financial markets, of proposals to improve control although 
careful  analysis of the possible side effects of any proposal would be required 
before it is adoptea. 
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problem into several parts. First, the structure of reserve requirements is 
analyzed in an effort to answer the following question: If the total reserves 
of member banks of the Federal Reserve System could be controlled per- 
fectly, how precise would be control over member bank deposits? 
Second, the control of member bank reserves is evaluated to determine 
the significance of changes in reserves occurring from such factors as fluc- 
tuations in float and in currency held by the public. 
Finally, measurement errors in the money stock data are considered. 
Historically, revisions of the data have arisen from such factors as the 
correction of clerical errors, new estimates of nonmember bank deposits, 
and changes in the definition of money. However, it is found that revisions 
of seasonal adjustment factors account for much larger revisions in the 
short-run rate of growth of the seasonally adjusted money stock than do 
revisions in the underlying data. Seasonality issues are, therefore, central 
to the appraisal of short-run monetary control. 
Theoretical Importance  of Money Stock Control 
Most analyses of monetary policy assume that the money stock is subject 
to precise control and then seek to determine the path for the money stock 
that is optimal to pursue the basic objectives of national economic policy- 
full employment, price stability, and long-run growth-and  subsidiary ob- 
jectives such as interest rate stability, avoidance of undue sectoral impacts, 
and the like. In this section a different approach is taken: The existence of 
errors in achieving the target path for the money stock is explicitly recog- 
nized and the importance of these errors for the objectives of monetary 
policy is evaluated. 
Some theoretical insight into this problem can be obtained from an ex- 
tension of a simple model one of the authors has presented  elsewhere.4  This 
model addresses  the question as to whether stability of the economy is more 
likely to be obtained by a monetary policy that controls interest rates or by 
one that controls the money stock. The basic conclusion of the analysis was 
that if disturbances originate primarily in the IS function that summarizes 
the real sectors of the economy-in  consumption and investment behavior 
4.  William Poole, "Optimal Choice of  Monetary Policy Instruments  in a  Simple 
Stochastic Macro Model," Quarterly Jourlial of  Econtomics, Vol. 84 (May 1970), pp. 
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and in government spending and taxation-the  money stock is the proper 
control instrument. But if the LM function, reflecting  the monetary sector, 
is the source of disturbances,  the interest rate is the proper control variable. 
More generally, the choice of instrument depends on the relative impor- 
tance of real versus monetary disturbances. 
The original model assumed that the monetary authorities could control 
the money stock precisely and, accordingly, that all monetary disturbances 
were caused by shifts in the public's demand for money. The extension of 
the model takes the form of analyzing the effects of errors in controlling the 
money stock. 
A linear version of the monetary sector of the simple Keynesian model 
has the following equations: 
(1)  L = bo  + biY + b2r +  v,  b1 > O, b2 <  0; 
(2)  M =  M* +  e; 
(3)  L=M, 
wlhere L =  the demand for money 
Y =  income 
r =  the interest rate 
v =  a random disturbance 
M = the actual supply of money 
M* =  the supply of money desired by the monetary authorities 
e =  a random disturbance. 
The coefficients b1 and b2 have signs as suggested  'by the theory of the de- 
mand for money. Equation (3) is the equilibrium condition requiring that 
the quantity of money demanded equal the quantity of money supplied.5 
Equations (1), (2),  and (3) can be combined to  produce 
(4)  Y =  L-[M*  -fbo  -  b2ra-t(vn-  e)f. 
This equation is a stochastic LMf  function with random terms from both the 
5. More specifically,  equation  (2) could make the supply  of money a function  of in- 
come, the interest  rate,  and a monetary  policy  variable  subject  to precise  control, such  as 
the monetary  base.  The entire  model  could then be solved  in terms  of the monetary  policy 
control  variable.  The more  articulated  versioni  of equation  (2) makes  possible  analysis  of 
the significance  of the signs  and sizes  of the parameters  of the money  supply  function.  Be- 
cause  these  parameters  seem unlikely  to be of much  practical  importance,  that approach 
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demand and supply of money functions. The addition of the stochastic IS 
function, equation (5), closes the model. 
(5)  Y=ac+air+u,  a,  <0, 
where u is a random disturbance. 
The policy problem is now that of choosing between the interest rate and 
an imperfectly controlled money stock as the policy instrument. Once this 
choice is made, the IS and LM functions may be combined to produce a 
solution for income in terms of the parameters,  the stochastic disturbances, 
and either r or M*. The formal structure of the problem is identical to that 
in which it is assumed to be possible to control M precisely, except that the 
solution for income embodies M* instead of M and the random disturbance 
(v -  e) instead of v. 
The earlier paper6  shows that, with a quadratic loss function arising from 
income instability, the loss from following a money stock policy is 
(6)  LM  =  (aibi +  b2)-2(a2cf2-  2alb2o-,, 
+ 
b20.2). 
This same equation gives the loss from income instability under imperfect 
monetary control if o- is substituted for  _ and -ruW  for czU,  where w =  v -  e. 
2  Since the loss, Lr, under an interest rate policy is simply o-,  a money stock 
policy is superior to an interest rate policy if L11/L, <  1, or 
29o  +  c.2  -' 
(7)  (alb, +  b)2[  a  2i  e)+  b]  1~  ~~  2a1b2  ?  <1. 
The question now is that of the impact of imperfect monetary control, as 
represented by the random error e, in the loss function. 
As equation (7) demonstrates, the random error e can theoretically re- 
duce  the loss from  income  instability  if Cve  and  Co.e are  of the right  sign and 
magnitude. In all probability, however, imprecise monetary control de- 
creases income stability. Only if Uve  is positive and larger than  -2/2  would 
a! be less than  -2.7  Analysis of the covariance term Cue  points in the same 
6. Poole, "Optimal  Choice," p. 205. 
7.  The argument for a positive  a,e  is that banks would tend to respond  to a  random 
increase  in the demand  for money  by making  additional  loans and holding  smaller  excess 
reserves,  thereby  increasing  the supply  of money.  This effect  would be offset to the extent 
that the increased  demand  for rnoney  involved  an increased  demand  for currency,  which 
tends to reduce  the supply  of money.  While  G,,e may  well be positive,  these  considerations 
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direction. If anything,  Tt18 is probably positive since a positive u-an  au- 
tonomous increase in investment, for example-might  be associated with 
an increase in bank loans to finance the additional spending. Since a,  and 
b2 are both negative, 2alb2cTue  is likely to be positive, thus decreasing the 
attractiveness of a monetary control policy. 
The theoretical possibility that the sizes and signs of oT,e  and aue might be 
such as to make imperfect monetary control better than precise control 
makes clear the need for a careful search for obscure repercussions before 
adopting proposals to improve monetary control. Nevertheless, these pos- 
sibilities seem so unlikely to be realized in practice that a strong prima facie 
case emerges for the assumption throughout the rest of this paper that im- 
precise monetary control has genuine costs with respect to macroeconomic 
stabilization objectives. Indeed, the costs arising from imperfect monetary 
control could be sufficient  to make an optimal interest rate policy superior 
to an optimal money stock policy even tnough the latter would be superior 
if money control were precise. 
This simple model is built around the single objective of minimizing the 
variance of income around the desired level, Yf. Given this objective, equa- 
tion (8) shows the implications of the model for interest rate stability as 
measured by the variance, oi2, of the interest rate: 
(8)  or = (albi +  b2)-2[b'o' +0  2  +  o  +  2bl(au,  -Otue)  2Oze] 
It is clear that the variance of the interest rate is higher with imperfect 
monetary control unless  2  -2(blo-,e  +  Cve)  <  0. 
When control of the money stock is imperfect, therefore, banking dis- 
turbances-the  random factor, e-cause  greater variability in both income 
and interest rates. The existence of banking disturbances increases the at- 
tractiveness of an interest rate policy, through which the monetary authori- 
ties can both augment the stability of the financial markets and shield eco- 
nomic activity from disturbances in the demand and supply of money. The 
economic dislocations caused from time to time by instability in the bank- 
ing system support this line of reasoning. 
But we know far more about stabilizing the banking system and con- 
trolling the money stock than about stabilizing income, employment, and 
the price level. Therefore, the choice between a stabilization policy based on 
monetary aggregates and  one  based on  interest rates ought  not  to  be 
swayed by imprecision that, at very low cost, couLld  be significantly reduced 
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Reserve Requirements 
At the present time member banks of the Federal Reserve System are re- 
quired to hold reserves equal to or greater than specified percentages of 
various bank liability itenms.  If reserves were required only against demand 
deposits, if the requirement  consisted of a constant fraction--say,  20 per- 
cent-of  demand deposits for all banks, and if banks held no excess re- 
serves, control over reserves would provide precise control over demand 
deposits. In this textbook example, a $1,000 increase in reserves  would pro- 
duce a $5,000 increase in deposits. The purpose of this section is to examine 
the  extent to  which this  simple textbook  relationship breaks down  in 
practice. 
The relationship between demand deposits and reserves varies for four 
major reasons.  First,  the  reserve requirement varies according  to  the 
amount of demand deposits in a given bank and according to the class of 
the bank (reserve city or country). Second, a number of items other than 
demand deposits are subject to reserve requirements.  Third, banks hold a 
varying amount of excess reserves. And, fourth, at present reserve require- 
ments are based on deposits lagged two weeks, thereby introducing varia- 
bility into the relationship between reserves  and deposits in the same week. 
The structure of reserve requirements against demand deposits is quite 
complex and subject to fairly frequent revision.8  At the present time a bank 
computes its gross demand deposits as the sum of (a) interbank  demand de- 
posits (that is, deposits that are owed to another commercial bank); (b) 
U.S.  government demand deposits; and (c) all other deposits. From this 
total the bank subtracts cash items in the process of collection and items 
due from other commercial banks (the interbank deposits of those banks) 
to  obtain net demand deposits, the magnitude against which reserve re- 
quirements are assessed. 
As of August 1972, the reserve  requirements  against net demand deposits 
for a reserve city bank were 17 percent on the part under $5 million, and 
17.5 percent on the remainder; the corresponding figures for  a  country 
bank were 12.5 percent and 13 percent. With this structure  of requirements, 
a shift of $1,000 of demand deposits from a reserve  city to a country bank, 
both of which have deposits over $5 million, would reduce required  reserves 
8. The details of these requirements  are specified  by the Federal  Reserve's  Regula- 
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by $45, thereby supporting additional demand deposits of about $346 at a 
country bank, or about $257 at a reserve city bank. Thus, under current 
arrangements, deposits can fluctuate widely even though aggregate bank 
reserves are constant. 
Another source of disturbance stems from reserve requirements  on non- 
money bank liabilities. These include U.S. government and interbank de- 
mand deposits, commercial paper issued by  bank affiliates, Eurodollar 
borrowings, and time and savings deposits (hereafter referred  to simply as 
"time deposits" unless there is reason to distinguish between the two). 
Study of these matters is complicated by the fact that the "old" system of 
reserve requirements outlined above is in the process of being replaced.9 
The new system, given below, effectively abolishes the distinction between 
reserve city and country banks. The requirements against time deposits, 
Eurodollars, and commercial paper are not affected. 
Net demand  deposits 
(millions  oJ  Reserve  requirement 
dollars)  (percent) 
First 2  8 
2-10  10 
10-100  12 
100-400  13 
Over  400  17.5 
The current reserve requirement  is 3 percent of savings deposits and cer- 
tain time deposits, 3 percent of other time deposits up to $5 million, and 5 
percent of other time deposits above that amount. For purposes of reserve 
requirements, commercial paper issued by bank affiliates is added to net 
demand deposits if it has an original maturity of less than 30 days, and to 
time deposits if the original maturity is 30 days or more. The reserve re- 
quiremllent  for Eurodollar borrowings is 20 percent of the amount above a 
specified base.10 
With the exception of Eurodollars, deposits subject to reserve require- 
ments are averaged over  a  "statement" week  running from  Thursday 
9. The new requirements  became  fully effective  on November 16 following  a transi- 
tional week, November  9 through 15, in which the requirements  were between  the new 
and the old levels. 
10. The Board  of Governors  has proposed  to reduce  the reserve  requirement  on Euro- 
dollar borrowings  to 10 percent  and to eliminate  the reserve-free  base.  (See Federal  Re- 
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through Wednesday. Deposits  are measured as of the close  of  business 
each day, and since a seven-day week is used, Friday's deposits count also 
for Saturday and Sunday for a bank not open on weekends. Holidays are 
treated in the same fashion.11  Eurodollar reserve  requirements  are based on 
a four-week average. Finally,  in any given statement week required re- 
serves are based on deposits two weeks earlier. 
To study the effects of these complicated reserve requirements-both  old 
and new-we  have analyzed weekly average data for individual member 
banks for the period from October 7, 1970, through November 3, 1971.12 
These are the actual dates of the deposit items, which, under the lagged re- 
quirements system now in effect, give rise to required reserves two weeks 
later. 
The analysis was conducted under the assumption that M1 appropriately 
defines "the" money stock. Under this definition the money stock consists 
of the sum of (a) private nonbank demand deposits at all commercial banks 
less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float;13  (b) 
foreign demand balances at Federal Reserve Banks; and (c) currency out- 
side the Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and vaults of all commercial 
banks. In controlling M1 the  principal strategy must be to  control  the 
member bank portion of item (a)-hereafter  referred  to simply as "member 
bank demand deposits." The nature of that task is indicated by the stability 
of the ratio that total required reserves bears to these deposits. 
The analysis of the individual bank data reveals that this ratio was rea- 
sonably stable over the sample period, and would have been even more 
stable had the new reserve requirements  been in effect.14  Under the old re- 
11. A desirable  reform  would be to base reserve  requirements  on a weekly  average  of 
business days. The present procedure  distorts the markets by giving extra weight to 
Friday  and preholiday  figures. 
12. These dates refer  to the Wednesdays  of statement  weeks.  The sample  period  was 
selected  to avoid major  changes  in reserve  requirements.  Its beginning  was dictated  by the 
lowering  from 6 to 5 percent  of the reserve  requirement  on time deposits  in excess of $5 
million,  effective  the statement  week of October  7, 1970; its end by the unavailability,  at 
the time the statistical  analysis was done, of the historical  tapes of member  bank data 
beyond November  3, 1971.  The period  is not quite "pure,"  however,  because  the Euro- 
dollar requirement  was changed in January  1971. 
13. Strictly  speaking,  the term "private"  is a misnomer  since state and local govern- 
ment  deposits  are included.  The technically  correct  term  is "demand  deposits  other than 
interbank  and U.S. Treasury." 
14. The aggregate  reserve  ratio under  the old requirements  can, of course, be calcu- 
lated from the published  aggregate  data. However,  the individual  bank  data are required 
to analyze the sources  of variance  in the total ratio and to calculate  what aggregate  re- 
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quirements, the ratio of total required reserves to demand deposits aver- 
aged a little over 24 percent. The standard deviation of this percentage over 
the fifty-seven-week  sample period was 0.44, and its coefficient of variation 
-the  ratio of the standard  deviation to the mean-was  0.44/24.34  = 0.018, 
or 1.8 percent. If, contrary to fact, the variability of the required reserve 
ratio had arisen solely from variability of the deposit mix with total re- 
serves fixed, the variability of the required reserve ratio would have been 
associated with a standard deviation of demand deposits of about 1.8 per- 
cent, or $2.7 billion at the current level of member bank deposits.15  Week 
by week, and even month by month, such disturbances can produce very 
high (or very low) annual rates of growth. 
This calculation is presented only to provide some feel for the significance 
of the standard deviation-0.44  percentage point-of  the required reserve 
ratio. As explained in a later section, with the system of lagged reserve re- 
quirements it is impossible to fix the total dollar amount of reserves at a 
predetermined  level. Moreover, the analysis here is of the variability of the 
required  reserve ratio; if total reserves were fixed under a system of simul- 
taneous required reserves the variability in excess reserves probably would 
offset part of that in the required reserve ratio, thereby reducing the varia- 
bility of the ratio of total reserves to demand deposits. 
Under the new reserve  requirements  the standard deviation of the reserve 
ratio is lower-about  0.37 percent instead of 0.44 percent. However, since 
the average level of the ratio is also lower-21.64  percent-the  reduction in 
the coefficient of variation of the required reserve ratio is only from 1.8 to 
1.7 percent. 
To examine the new requirements  more closely, it is useful to divide the 
total dollar figure of required  reserves for all member banks into the dollar 
amounts required against (a) demand deposits; (b) Treasury deposits; (c) 
net interbank deposits; (d) time deposits; (e) Eurodollars; and (f) commer- 
cial paper.'" This procedure yields an identity with total required reserves 
15. For the derivation,  see Maurice  G. Kendall  and Alan Stuart,  The  Advaiced  Theory 
of Statistics, Vol. I (2d ed., London: Charles  Griffin,  1963), p. 232. 
16. As explained  earlier,  Regulation  D specifies  a reserve  requirement  against  the sum 
of items  (a), (b), and (c). Since the reserve  requirements  are based  on the size of the sum, 
some arbitrary  procedure  must  be employed  to assign  items  to size-and  therefore  to re- 
quirement-brackets. In this study the dollar required  reserves  against the three items 
have been  separated  by first  calculating  item  (a) as if net interbank  and Treasury  deposits 
were botlh  zero, then  calculating  item  (b) at the margin  given  actual  demand  deposits  and 
Treasury  deposits  of zero, and  finally  calculating  item  (c) at the margin  given  demand  and 
net interbaink  deposits.  This procedure  was selected because  of interest  in the effects  of 
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on one side and six separate items on the other. Dividing the identity by 
total demand deposits yields the identity that the ratio of total required 
reserves  to demand deposits equals the sum of the ratios for the six separate 
items. A variance-covariance  matrix of the six item ratios can then be used 
to indicate the extent to which each of the items contributes to the total 
variance. Since the variance of the total ratio is equal to the sum of the vari- 
ances of the six item ratios plus twice their covariances with one another, 
it is natural to discuss the empirical results in terms of variances and co- 
variances.  The analysis has been run in terms of both levels and weekly first 
differences. 
It is clear that the specification of different requirements for different 
sizes of deposits causes negligible difficulty. In levels, the variance of the 
percentage of reserves required on demand deposits relative to demand de- 
posits is only 0.0021 out of the total variance of 0.1403 under the new re- 
quirements. Systematic shifts of deposits between banks of different sizes 
are simply not very important. 
The real problem is caused by shifts in the ratios of other iterns to de- 
mand deposits. In terms of levels, the biggest source of variability is time 
deposits with a reserve percentage variance of 0.1101. Under the new re- 
quirements Treasury deposits and net interbank deposits have reserve per- 
centage variances of 0.0308 and 0.0209, respectively, wlhile  the correspond- 
ing figures for Eurodollars and commercial paper are 0.0003 and 0.0015. 
These variances, along with the mostly small covariances, sumil  to the total 
variance of 0.1403 under the new requirements. 
The analysis of the variability of the level of the required reserve ratio 
suggests the extent of the "defensive" open market operations necessary 
to prevent shifts in the ratio from affecting member bank demand deposits. 
If defensive operations could  fix demand deposits precisely at a  prede- 
termined level, then (by an argument parallel to that uised  above for the 
assumption of fixed reserves)  the standard deviation of bank reserves under 
the old reserve  requirements  would be 1.8 percent, or about $600 million at 
the current level of member bank reserves. To this extent, defensive open 
market operations could be eliminated and the precision of monetary con- 
trol improved if the structure of reserve requirements  were reformed. 
The analysis in terms of levels somewhat exaggerates the control prob- 
lem arising from variability in the required  reserve  ratio. Longer-run  trends 
in the deposit mix add to the variance in levels, but to the extent that they 
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ences of the required  reserve ratio provides a measure of the control prob- 
lem for a given week under the assumption that the ratio for the previous 
week is known. However, lags in data availability make this an unrealistic 
assumption, and so the first difference analysis somewhat understates the 
control problem. 
Compared with the variances in levels of 0.1403, the variance of total 
required reserves as a percentage of demand deposits in first differences is 
0.0931, the largest shares of which are contributed by Treasury deposits- 
0.0306-and  net interbank deposits-0.0406.  Time deposits contribute only 
0.0091, and the structure of demand deposits only 0.0020. 
PROPOSALS  FOR  REFORM  OF  RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS 
The possibilities for reform to improve control focus on Treasury, net 
interbank, and time deposits, since the other items, in either levels or first 
differences, contribute little to the total variance. Treasury deposits do not 
make the largest contribution to the variance of the level of the ratio of 
reserves to demand deposits, but they are difficult to predict and therefore 
to offset. Time deposits make the largest contribution in levels, but behave 
smoothly and are relatively predictable, as their relatively small contribu- 
tion to variance in first differences suggests. 
The elimination of the reserve requirements against some of these items 
appears to be desirable. These requirements are holdovers from the days 
when required reserves were viewed as reserves-funds  available to meet 
emergencies. But it is now widely recognized that required reserves serve 
this function only to a small degree: With, say, a 15 percent reserve  require- 
ment, a $1,000 cash drain from a bank releases only $150 of reserves. 
Reserve requirements are now correctly viewed in the context  of  en- 
hancing monetary control by making the reserve  ratio more stable and pre- 
dictable than it would be in the absence of requirements.  A poorly designed 
set of reserve requirements can, however, make the ratio of total reserves 
to deposits more rather than less volatile because the requirements  on non- 
money items produce instability. One example might be the reserve  require- 
ment against time certificates of deposit (CDs). Since a bank has no obliga- 
tion to redeem CDs before maturity, it seems likely that voluntarily held 
reserves against them would be minimal. Because the amounts outstanding 
fluctuate over time, so do the reserves held against them, and thus so do 
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The most logical candidate for the elimination of reserve requirements  is 
Treasury  deposits. Here, reserves serve no safety function at all since banks 
accepting Treasury deposits must post 100 percent collateral against them 
in the form of government securities. Taking account of the variance of re- 
serves against Treasury deposits as a percentage of demand deposits plus 
the covariance of this percentage with other items, under the new arrange- 
ments exempting Treasury deposits from the reserve requirements would 
reduce the variance of the total reserve ratio by 0.0422 in levels (out of a 
total of 0.1403) and by 0.0496 in first differences  (out of a total of 0.0931). 
Some  might object that removing requirements on Treasury deposits 
would increase interest rate fluctuations in the money markets. The argu- 
ment runs that when, for example, taxes are paid, the initial impact is to 
reduce demand deposits and to increase Treasury deposits. If no reserves 
were required on Treasury deposits, this shift would release reserves that 
the banks would use, at least initially, to  buy short-term securities. The 
reverse would occur when the Treasury drew down its deposits to make 
payments to the public for goods and services. 
This objection, however, is based on an incomplete analysis of what hap- 
pens when Treasury deposits change under the current system. A corpora- 
tion that pays, say, $100,000 in taxes ordinarily will put the accumulated 
tax funds in short-term  securities such as Treasury bills. When the taxes are 
due, the bills will be sold and the funds will reside only momentarily in 
private demand deposits.  In a  before-and-after comparison, private de- 
mand deposits will be down $100,000, Treasury deposits up $100,000, and 
both the quantity of bills outstanding and excess reserves of the banking 
system unchanged. However, the bill rate must be higher if the nonbank 
private sector is to be in equilibrium holding the same quantity of bills but 
smaller demand deposits. 
Now  consider the same case under a system without reserve require- 
ments on Treasury deposits. If the reserve requirement on private demand 
deposits is 15 percent, the banking system will have $15,000 of excess re- 
serves just after the taxes are paid. Through the usual multiple expansion 
in response to excess reserves, the system can expand private deposits and 
bank assets by $100,000. For simplicity, suppose the banks simply buy 
$100,000 of Treasury  bills from the nonbank public. In this case, the before- 
and-after comparison shows the nonbank public with unchanged demand 
deposits, and with both bill holdings and tax liabilities down by $100,000. 
Since the bills were earmarked for taxes in the first place, there is every 
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The same basic argument holds when the Treasury floats a bond issue 
and puts the proceeds initially into Treasury  deposits at commercial banks. 
Without reserve requirements on Treasury deposits, the bonds could be 
sold with no initial impact on interest rates if they were sold directly to 
banks. The  banks would simultaneously buy the bonds  and credit the 
Treasury deposits. The outcome is essentially identical when the Treasury 
floats the issue publicly: Deposits  are transferred from the public to the 
Treasury, and banks use the resulting excess reserves  to buy assets from the 
public, thereby restoring demand deposits to the initial level. 
When the process moves in reverse-the  Treasury draws down its de- 
posits and makes disbursements to the public or retires debt-the  same 
conclusion emerges: Reserve requirements on Treasury deposits reinforce 
the impact on the money market of fluctuations in such deposits. 
This conclusion finds support in the analysis of the sources of variability 
of the relationship between total required reserves and demand deposits. 
The covariance between (new) reserves required against demand deposits 
as a percentage of demand deposits and (new) reserves required against 
Treasury deposits  as  a percentage of  demand deposits  is  actually very 
slightly positive. This result holds for both levels and first differences  and is 
explained by the fact that the Federal Reserve cushions the interest rate im- 
pact of tax dates and Treasury financings, thereby producing a near-zero 
covariance between demand and Treasury deposits rather than a negative 
one. 
The situation with respect to net interbank deposits is more complex. 
For the banking system as a whole, net interbank deposits are, of course, 
zero, but for Federal Reserve member banks they are positive. Monetary 
control clearly would improve if all banks were required to be members of 
the Federal Reserve System. Under current arrangements, however, fluc- 
tuations in net interbank deposits at member banks probably in part reflect 
those in nonmember bank deposits relative to member bank deposits. In- 
terbank deposits in part serve to meet the nonmember bank reserve re- 
quirements established by the various state banking authorities. In order 
to stabilize M1, and not just its member bank demand deposit component, 
it is therefore appropriate that increases in deposits at nonmember banks 
that lead to larger net interbank deposits at member banks should absorb 
reserves and exert downward pressure on member bank deposits. Unfor- 
tunately, it is impossible to confirm this argument because of the lack of 
data on nonmember banks. 
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requirements  against time deposits. Of the 0.1403 variance in levels of total 
new required reserves to demand deposits, time deposits contribute 0.0794 
(including covariances). In first differences, of the total of 0.0931 the time 
deposit contribution is 0.0149.17  These figures are large enough to support 
a tentative conclusion that elimination of reserve  requirements  against time 
deposits would be desirable if the M1 definition of money is accepted. If the 
M2 definition is accepted, control over M2 could obviously be improved by 
equalizing reserve requirements on all deposit items included in M2 and 
abolishing them on everything else.18 
The inmportance  of  improved accuracy of  monetary control may cer- 
tainly be questioned with respect to  so fine a matter as reserve require- 
ments on time deposits. A perfectly reasonable position would be simply 
to accept the imprecision in monetary control resulting from time deposit 
fluctuations. 
LAGGED  RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS 
Since September 18, 1968, required reserves for a given statement week 
have been based on deposits two  weeks earlier. On its face this system 
seems to  be attractive since in a given week the individual bank knows 
exactly the dollar amount of required reserves. With contemporaneous re- 
serve requirements, the bank faces uncertainty about its precise required 
reserves since its internal accounting system cannot process all deposit 
changes instantaneously and in some cases may not for several days. 
17. Because  of the covariance  between  time and Treasury  deposits, these figures  in- 
clude 0.0045 in the levels and 0.0092 in the first  differences  that are also included  in the 
figures  given above for the contribution  of Treasury  deposits. 
18. Anotlher  possibility  would be to work witlh  a weiglhted  average of M1 and M2 
and set the reserve  requirement  on time deposits at a level appropriate  to tlle weighted 
average  selected.  If M  =  wMl  +  (I  -  w)M2,  where  w is the weight  given  M1, then M  = 
wMl  +  (1  -  w)(Ml  +  TD)  =  M1 +  (I  -  w)TD,  where TD is time deposits  otlher than 
large  CDs. Suppose  further  that the required  reserve  ratios  against  demand  and time de- 
posits  are set at ri and r2, respectively,  suchI  that r2/rl  = (1 -  w). Examples  of such  cal- 
culations  confirm  that, provided  that they are not accompanied  by changes  in excess re- 
serves,  slhifts  between  demand  and time deposits  will not affect the weighted  average  M. 
Several problems  beset this approaclh.  There is little in economic theory to determine 
the correct value for w. If w were selected simply so that (1  -  w)  =  r2/rl  under existing 
reserve  requirements,  w would have to be changed whenever  shifts in reserve  require- 
ments altered r2/rl,  and these changes would produce  discontinuities  in the M series. 
Furtlhermore,  even if r2/rl remained  constant,  without  a convincing  economic  argument 
for using a weighted  average  it would be impossible  to defend  the M series  against  tlle 
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This argument fails to take account of two factors, however. First, under 
neither system can a bank predict its close-of-business reserve position- 
the difference between reserves held and reserves required-with  perfect 
accuracy. Last-minute deposit inflows or outflows from check-clearing are 
at the same time last-minute reserve inflows or outflows. Under a con- 
temporaneous system, a last-minute reserve flow produces some  offset, 
although a small one, in required  reserves. In managing its reserve position 
the average bank probably finds this offset much more important than is 
the uncertainty generated by accounting lags. 
The second factor neglected by the argument for lagged reserve require- 
ments is the secondary impact of individual bank adjustments on the sys- 
tem as a whole. Under the present system required reserves in any given 
week are a fixed number of dollars since nothing can be done to affect de- 
posits outstanding two weeks ago. By hook or by crook, this quantity of 
reserves must be found for the banking system as a whole. If a bank short 
of reserves adjusts by selling some assets, its gain in reserves must mean a 
loss to some other bank. Individual bank adjustment does not contribute 
to banking system adjustment. The game is "Old Maid" when there are 
excess reserves  in the system as a whole, and "Young Beauty Queen" when 
there are deficient reserves! 
Under a system of contemporaneous reserve requirements, secondary 
adjustment can lead to  a reduction in the dollar amount of required re- 
serves if there is a reserve shortage. The banking system as a whole can re- 
duce a reserve shortage in a given week with a fixed quantity of reserves if 
individual banks sell assets to the nonbank public and thereby decrease the 
deposits upon which reserve requirements are based. 
The practical possibilities for this secondary adjustment in the short run 
are limited, but not insignificant. Many corporate financial officers with 
sharp pencils are quite prepared  to buy short-term, highly liquid assets and 
hold them for a few days if the yield is attractive. A temporary increase in 
interest rates caused by reserve stringency holds the promise of  capital 
gains if yields are expected to fall back in a few days. The demand for de- 
mand deposits may be quite interest elastic in the very short run around the 
expected or "normal" level of the interest rate. 
In any event, lagged reserve requirements preclude both primary and 
secondary adjustments since current deposit changes do not affect current 
required  reserves. With lagged reserve  requirements,  attempts by individual 
banks to adjust to a reserve  shortage will exert pressure on the money mar- 
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borrow the needed reserves from the Federal Reserve, or to force the Fed- 
eral Reserve to create the needed reserves through an open market pur- 
chase or some other technique.19  In the case of a reserve surplus, the down- 
ward pressure on the money market continues until banks become willing 
to hold excess reserves, or the Federal Reserve intervenes  to destroy some.20 
To obtain some evidence on the influence of lagged reserve requirements 
on the stability of money growth and money market conditions, we have 
examined the weekly behavior of M1 (not seasonally adjusted), the federal 
funds rate, and free reserves before and after the introduction of lagged re- 
serve requirements. The  "before" period runs for 246 statement weeks 
from January 1, 1964, through September 11, 1968, the "after" period for 
197 statement weeks from September 25, 1968, through June 28, 1972. For 
the money stock, the standard deviation of the percent per week change in 
unadjusted M1 was  1.01 in the "before" period and  1.07 in the "after" 
period. 
In judging money market stability, perhaps the best summary measure is 
the variability of the weekly change in the federal funds rate. The standard 
deviation of this variable rose from 0.26 percentage point in the "before" 
period to  0.34 in the "after" period. Another useful measure is free re- 
serves, the difference between excess reserves and borrowings from the 
Federal Reserve.2' The standard deviation of the weekly change in free 
reserves was $124 million in the "before" period and $244 million in the 
"after" period. 
These findings thus reveal slightly less stability in both money growth 
and money market conditions since adoption of the lagged reserve require- 
19. Offering  a third  alternative  under  the current  system,  Regulation  D provides  that 
a bank may  carry  over to the next week excess  or deficient  reserves  up to 2 percent  of the 
requirement.  This provision  was introduced  at the same time as the system  of lagged  re- 
serve  requirements. 
20. "The new rules, by eliminating  current  changes in required  reserves  as a source 
of change  in desired  reserves,  have  increased  the work  done by price  [that  is, federal  funds 
rate] movements  in adjusting  desired  reserves."  Warren  L. Coats, Jr., "The September, 
1968, Changes in 'Regulation D' and their Implications  for Money Stock Control" 
(Ph.D. thesis, University  of Chicago, 1972).  The Coats study  contains  much  analysis  and 
evidence  relevant  to this paper. 
21. In calculating  free reserves  in the "after" period, excess reserves  have been ad- 
justed to reflect  the significant  carry-over  provisions  of the reserve  requirement  regula- 
tions. In the "after"  period, the average  level of excess reserves  was about $214 million 
while the average level of carry-over  reserves  was about $93 million. The carry-over 
figures  are published  in the H.4.1 weekly Federal Reserve release, "Factors Affecting 
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ments system. They do not show conclusively whether the lagged system 
has made control a little less or a little more precise. The control problem 
depends both on the stability-and  therefore the predictability-of  the re- 
lationships among total  reserves, free reserves, the  funds rate, and the 
money stock, and on the source of disturbances to the system. The lagged 
reserve requirements  system in all probability reduces the stability of short- 
run functional relationships and to that extent the precision of week-by- 
week control. In controlling the money stock, the Federal Reserve must 
attempt to affect deposits in a given week by changing reserves. Since total 
reserves in a given week must equal or exceed the required reserves given 
by deposits two weeks earlier, control must be exercised by changing the 
extent to which total reserves are supplied through the discount window 
relative to the excess reserves in the banking system. An open market sale 
tends to reduce the excess reserves of banks in a surplus position, and to 
increase the borrowings of banks in a shortage position. The "free reserves" 
of the banking system decline. The problem is to know how the decline in 
free reserves will affect current  deposits in the banking system. 
The relationship between free reserves and deposits is likely to be less 
stable with lagged reserve  requirements.  If, as noted earlier, a bank attempts 
to adjust to a shortage of reserves by selling assets to the public, the result- 
ing reduction in deposits does nothing to ease the reserve shortage for the 
banking system as a whole. At this point two conflicting forces come into 
play. As the money markets tighten, banks may decide simply to borrow 
the needed reserves from the Federal Reserve. To the extent that they do, 
the reserve shortage does not reduce the current deposits of the banking 
system. This effect would be the more likely the firmer were bank expecta- 
tions that money market rates were only temporarily high, because, rather 
than sell assets to the public at the capital loss implied by the temporarily 
high rates, the banks would borrow instead from the Federal Reserve. On 
the other hand, if rate expectations are revised upward, the banks will be 
more likely to adjust by selling assets to the nonbank public. But this pro- 
cess may be overdone. Current deposits may fall below the level appropri- 
ate to the current level of bank reserves because the reduction in current 
deposits does not reduce current required reserves and therefore does not 
ease the reserve shortage causing the upward pressure on the money mar- 
kets. 
On the whole it seems likely that the response of the banking system in 
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be weaker and less predictable under the system of lagged reserve require- 
ments than under the contemporaneous requirements system.2  Stability 
of short-run relationships, however, is not the whole story; the source of a 
change in bank reserve positions is also important. Suppose, for example, 
that there is a surge in bank loans and therefore in deposits. Other things 
equal, in two weeks a reserve shortage will occur. In this case it would be 
desirable for banks to react strongly to the reserve shortage to reduce de- 
posits and thereby wipe out the unwanted surge. Better yet, under either 
the lagged or the contemporaneous systems, would be bank reactions that 
forestall a deposit surge in the first place. But strong and predictable bank 
reactions to changed reserve positions are detrimental to deposit stability 
when the source of disturbance is on the reserve side through, for example, 
changes in the deposit mix, as discussed earlier in this section, or through 
fluctuations in items such as float, to be discussed in the following section. 
Thus, the lagged requirements  system will be preferable  if reserve positions 
are disturbed principally from the reserve side rather than the deposit side 
and if bank reactions are weaker under this system. 
Even if this last proposition is true, the system of lagged requirements 
will be inferior to the contemporaneous requirements  system if most of the 
reserve  disturbances  can be eliminated. Since a major theme of this paper is 
that reserve disturbances can be eliminated for all practical purposes, the 
conclusion is that requirements  ought to be placed on a contemporaneous 
basis in order to improve the accuracy of monetary control. In any event, 
the lagged requirements system does not make reserve management any 
easier for the banks and does tend to intensify money market instability. 
Provision and Use of Member Bank Reserves 
In the previous section we examined the stability of member bank de- 
mand deposits in light of  the structure of  reserve requirements, taking 
member bank reserves as given. We now turn to the determination of ag- 
gregate member bank reserves. 
The analysis is based on the accounting statement of sources and ulses 
(supplying and absorbing items) of reserve funds (Tables A-4 and A-5 in 
the Federal  Reserve Bulletin).  The various items from this accounting state- 
22. This conclusion  is based  on the a priori  argument  sketched  above and on evidence 
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ment have been combined into seven composite items in such a way as to 
preserve  the accounting identity. The only part of this procedure requiring 
special mention is that to obtain a composite item consisting of total mem- 
ber bank reserves requires adding member bank vault cash reserves-an 
item not included in the basic sources and uses identity-to  member bank 
reserves on deposit at Federal Reserve Banks.23  To maintain the account- 
ing identity, vault cash reserves are also added to the composite currency 
item appearing on the other side of the identity. 
The composite item, total member bank reserves, is identically equal to 
six other items, the exact definitions of which are given later. These six 
items, in the order in which they are analyzed below, are (1) Federal Re- 
serve float; (2) composite currency account; (3) miscellaneous items con- 
sisting of net foreign assets held by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
plus the net value of Federal Reserve and Treasury accounts not included 
elsewhere; (4) member bank borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks; (5) 
rounding error item necessary to maintain the identity precisely;  and (6) the 
Federal Reserve's open market portfolio. 
This procedure involves no behavioral hypotheses other than those im- 
plicit in the construction of the various composite categories. For example, 
fluctuations in float cannot validly be said to "cause" fluctuations in total 
member bank reserves  because a change in float may be offset by a change 
in another item on the right-hand  side of the identity. Such an offset would 
be indicated by a negative covariance between float and the other item. 
Even more significant, the variance of member bank reserves contributed 
by the noncontrollable items is not always undesired: When the Federal 
Reserve wishes to change member bank reserves  it can often simply permit, 
say, a currency drain to do the job without relying on open market opera- 
tions. 
Nonetheless, if a reformed system could prevent a noncontrollable item 
from affecting member bank reserves, the unwanted fluctuations would be 
eliminated and open market operations could be used to change reserves 
by the required amount. In this sense, evidence on the sources of variance 
23. All of the items  in the sources  and uses  identity  are end-of-day  figures;  the Blulletini 
provides  data in the form  of weekly  averages  of end-of-day  figures.  Vault  cash  reserves  do 
not appear in the basic identity because under the current  reserve  requirements  their 
amount for a given statement  week  consists  of average  holdings  of vault  cash two weeks 
earlier. Prior to September  12, 1968, vault cash reserves  consisted of the average of 
opening-of-day  vault cash (equivalent  to the previous  day's end-of-day  amount)  so that 
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of total  member  bank  reserves  can point  to areas  in which  reform  might  be 
desirable. 
Total  member  bank  reserves  and  the various  right-hand-side  items  in the 
reserves  identity  described  above have been processed  through  the com- 
puter  to obtain  a variance-covariance  matrix.  Because  of the shift  to lagged 
reserve  requirements,  the total sample  period  has been split into "period 
A," which  extends  for the 246  statement  weeks  from  the week  of January  1, 
1964,  through  the week  of September  11, 1968;  and "period  B," for the 171 
statement  weeks  from  the week  of September  25, 1968,  through  December 
29, 1971. There are thus 245 observations  of weekly first differences  in 
period  A and 170  in period  B. The data are in millions  of dollars. 
To estimate  the probable  contribution  of a proposed  reform  to reducing 
variance  calls for allocation of the covariance  terms to avoid double- 
counting,  and this is done by assigning  the covariance  terms  to the items 
in the order  in which  they are  discussed.  The order  selected  to some  extent 
is arbitrary,  and to some  extent  reflects  the authors'  judgment  as to which 
of the reforms  are less controversial  and thus of higher  priority. 
The findings  for the two periods  are  reported  in the two parts  of Table  1. 
The variables  have been denoted  as Xi, X2, . ..  ,  Xo, and these symbols 
serve as column heads. The variables X1 through X5 will be discussed in 
turn; X6 is the government  and agency  securities  portfolio  (plus a small 
amount  of bankers'  acceptances)  and is treated  somewhat  differently  from 
the other  items. 
To understand  how the table  is organized,  consider  the XI column.  The 
entry  in the XI row is the variance  of XI. The  entries  in the X2  through  X5 
rows are twice  the covariances  of X1 with these other  variables.  The sub- 
total row gives  the sum of the variance  and covariances.  In the absence  of 
open market  operations,  the subtotal  would  represent  the "contribution" 
of XI to the total variance  of member  bank  reserves.  The X6 row is twice 
the covariance  of Xo and X1 and shows  the extent  to which  open market 
operations  offset the contribution  shown by the subtotal.  The last row 
gives  the sum  of the subtotal  and  X6  rows.  Finally,  the  entries  in the "total" 
row are added to give the "grand  total." The grand  total is, of course, 
simply  the variance  of total member  bank  reserves. 
The results  suggest  that the introduction  of lagged  reserve  requirements 
has substantially  increased  the variance  of the weekly  change  in member 
bank  reserves.  (Hereafter,  unless  the analysis  in terms  of levels  is explicitly 
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Table 1. Matrix of Factors Contributing  to Variance of Member Bank 
Reserves, Two Periods, 1964-71 
First differences  of weekly observations,  in millions  of dollars 
Variablea 
Period  and  Grand 
variablea  Xi  X2  X3  X4  X5  Xo  total 
Period  A: January  1, 1964-September  11, 1968 
X1  82,256  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
X2  -16,620  81,261  ...  ...  ... 
X3  1,380  -33,486  39,358  ...  ...  ...  ... 
X4  -10,715  -15,303  2,608  17,819  ... 
X5  12  42  -17  1  2  ... 
Subtotal  56,313  32,514  41,949  17,820  2  ...  ... 
X6  -103,412  -110,793  -28,612  28,592  -41  140,061  ... 
Total  -47,099  -78,279  13,337  46,412  -39  140,061  74,393 
Period  B: September  25, 1968-December  29, 1971 
X1  155,071  ...  .....  ... 
X2  -164,688  127,825  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
X3  --1,744  -23,559  77,198  ...  ... 
X4  -22,409  -9,791  -31,761  53,846  ...  ...  ... 
XZ5  -44  -38  29  -6  8  ...  ... 
Subtotal  -33,814  94,437  45,466  53,840  8 
XA'  -88,441  -55,685  -79,614  30,219  359  194,624  ... 
Total  -122,255  38,752  -34,148  94,059  367  194,624  161,399 
Source:  Dei ived from data in Federal  Reserve  Bulletin, relevant  issues, pp. A-4, A-5. 
a.  Xi  Federal Reserve float. 
X2  comiiposite  currency-member  bank vault cash reserves minus the sum of (a)  member and non- 
memlber  bank vault cash and (b) the currency comiiponent  of Mt. 
X3  gold stock plus special drawing rights plus Treasury  currency outstanding plus Federal Reserve 
loans other than to member banks, minus the suml  of (a) foreign deposits at  Federal Reserve 
Banks; (b) Treasury  cash holdings; (c) Treasury  deposits at Federal Reserve Banks; (d) other de- 
posits at Federal Reserve Banks; (e) other Federal Reserve accour)ts. 
X4  miiemiiber  bank boirowing fromii  Federal Reserve Banks. 
X5  sum of all rounding errors in reserves  identity. 
Xo  U.S.  governmiient  and agency securities bought outright and  by repurchase agreement, and 
bankers' acceptances held by Federal Reserve Banks. 
The sum of Xi through Xs is equal to total member bank reserves. 
of the sample  period,  the variance  of member  bank  reserves  was 74,393;  in 
the second  half,  the variance  was 161,399.  No doubt  some  of this increased 
variance  is simply  a scale effect  from the growth  in the level of member 
bank reserves  from an average  of $22.8 billion in the first half to $28.5 
billion  in the second  half.  But  such  a scale  effect  can  account  for an increase 
in variance  of only about  56 percent  rather  than  the increase  of 117  percent 
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The variance of the Federal Reserve's government securities portfolio 
(hereafter  referred  to as "government  securities")  is 140,061 and 194,624 in 
periods A and B, respectively, exceeding the corresponding variances for 
member bank reserves in both cases. Open market operations clearly have 
a substantial "defensive" element designed to  offset the impact on bank 
reserves of fluctuations in other items. However, the increase in the govern- 
ment securities variance between period A and period B is only 39 percent. 
Defensive operations were apparently relatively less important in the sec- 
ond than in the first period. The growth in the open market variance was 
actually less than would be expected from the scale effect, and in period B 
the variance was smaller relative to that of member bank reserves than it 
was in A. 
The items accounting for the variance of member bank reserves  may now 
be examined in turn, and suggestions for reform to reduce variance will be 
presented. 
FLOAT 
Float (X1) arises from the fact that, when a member bank sends a check 
to the Federal Reserve for collection, the Fed on average credits the bank's 
reserve account before debiting the account of the bank upon which the 
check is drawn. The reduction of Federal Reserve float depends primarily 
on regulatory changes and investments in modern data processing equip- 
ment. Such reforms as the proposed amendments to Regulation J and the 
establishment of regional check processing centers should sharpen mone- 
tary control since fluctuations in float are difficult to  predict accurately 
and, therefore, to offset through open market operations. 
Although  Table  I  makes  plain that  the  net  contribution of  float  is 
negative, especially in period B,24 it would be desirable nonetheless to re- 
duce float. Much of the negative contribution is due to  defensive open 
market operations (Xe;) and to  member bank borrowing (X4), both  of 
which might be curtailed if float were reduced. The offset from the com- 
24. The explanation  for the large  negative  covariance  with X2  for period  B is that, for 
poorly understood  and apparently  independent  reasons,  float and vault cash both have 
intramonthly  patterns  in which the float peak is approximately  two weeks  later than the 
vault cash trough.  At the time of the shift to lagged  reserve  requirements  these patterns 
were  exploited  by lagging  vault  cash  reserves  by two weeks  so that  the fluctuations  in float 
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posite currency item (X2) would be unnecessary if the reserve regulations 
for vault cash were reformed as suggested below.25 
CURRENCY 
The impact of currency on member bank reserves  is complex. Three dif- 
ferent currency components-the  currency component  of  M1, member 
bank vault cash, and nonmember bank vault cash-have  been subtracted 
from member bank vault cash reserves to form the "composite currency" 
variable (X2). 
As was true of float, fluctuations in composite currency have been offset 
by defensive open nmarket  operations and member bank borrowing. How- 
ever, the negative covariance between X6 and X2 is more than accounted 
for by the covariance between X6 and the M1 currency component of X2. 
The M1 currency  component enters X2 with a negative sign; the covariance 
between M1 currency itself and X2 is positive. To an unknown extent the 
negative covariance between X2 and Xo simply reflects  positive covariances 
among M1, the currency component of M1, and XA6  rather than defensive 
operations. Part of the covariance between X2 and X6 should, therefore, 
appear in the X6 column of the table, and part remain in the X2 column. 
The aim of the institutional arrangements  should be to insulate M1 from 
the effects of currency drains. The use of lagged rather than current vault 
cash in bank reserves in period B insulates bank reserves from currency 
drains to  the extent that banks do  not replenish vault cash by drawing 
down reserves on deposit at Federal Reserve Banks, but this scheme does 
not  necessarily eliminate the impact on  M1. The easiest method of  in- 
sulating M1 from vault cash drains (or inflows) would be to deduct vault 
cash from gross demand deposits in calculating net demand deposits sub- 
ject to  reserve requirements. This proposal is equivalent to  counting as 
reserves a percentage of vault cash that is equivalent to the required re- 
serve ratio against demand deposits. Under this proposal, a currency drain 
would in the first instance force a bank to reduce deposits by the same dol- 
lar amount as the currency  drain, thus leaving the money stock unchanged. 
If the bank then replenished its vault cash by drawing down reserves on 
deposit at the Federal Reserve-a  step that, if not offset, would eventually 
25. Besides  control problems,  float also produces  a bias of unknown  extent in the 
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lead to a further  decline in deposits-the  Fed could easily offset the impact 
on  Ml  by an open market operation. The appropriate magnitude is the 
currency shipment times the quantity one minus the marginal reserve ratio 
on net demand deposits. For a perfect offset, the Fed has only to make sure 
that its own internal accounting system quickly transfers  to its open market 
desk information on its currency shipments to banks.26 
For a simple example of the effect of this proposal, suppose a bank's 
customers cash checks for $10,000 against their demand deposits, which 
have a reserve requirement of 20 percent. The currency component of M1 
would be up, and the demand deposit component down, by $10,000. Under 
the proposal, neither the bank's net deposits subject to reserve  requirements 
nor its reserves would have changed. If the bank replenished its vault cash 
by, say, $5,000 by reducing its reserves on deposit at the Fed, then the Fed 
could buy $4,000 ($5,000 times 0.8) of Treasury bills to offset exactly the 
effect of the currency drain on member bank reserves. 
This proposal would eliminate the impact of currency drains on M1 pre- 
cisely with no need for banks to report additional data and with no sig- 
nificant adverse side effects.27  Under the current system a currency drain 
may lead banks to begin the adjustment process involving a multiple con- 
traction of deposits before the Fed has the data that show what is hap- 
peining.  With large reserves of vault cash at the present time, banks have 
no need to replenish vault cash in the face of a currency drain, but they 
must begin to adjust reserve positions since the smaller vault cash is this 
week the smaller vault cash reserves  will be in two weeks. 
MISCELLANEOUS  ITEMS 
The items lumped together in variable X3-listed  in the note to Table 1- 
are far from trivial in size and general economic  significance. However, 
26. For a similar  proposal,  see Lloyd M. Valentine,  "A Proposal  for the Automatic 
Neutralization  of Currency  Flows," Americani  Econiomic Review,  Vol. 68 (March 1958), 
pp. 111-18. 
27. Other  things  equal,  counting  only part  of vault cash as reserves  would tend to re- 
duce bank  earnings.  If it were  desirable  to do so, this effect  could be offset by reducing  the 
required  reserve  ratio,  just as the new reserve  requirements  proposals  offset the effects  of 
the proposed  revisions  in Regulation  J. The only genuine  cost would be the tendency  to 
increased  shipments  of currency  and coin between  member  banks and the Federal  Re- 
serve Banks,  and even this could be avoided if the Federal  Reserve  held some of its cur- 
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monetary policy can exercise control over these items only to the extent of 
partially offsetting  their fluctuations  through open market operations. Since 
all of them appear on the books of either the Federal Reserve or the Trea- 
sury, the accounting systems of both agencies should be designed to trans- 
mit to  the open market desk information on changes in these items as 
rapidly as possible. 
BORROWING 
The contribution of member bank borrowing (X4) to total variance was 
substantial in both periods. To a considerable extent, as has been noted 
above, borrowing has offset fluctuations in other items. Suppression of 
these unwanted fluctuations through the reforms discussed above would 
obviate the need for such offsets. The positive covariance between borrow- 
ing and open market operations is probably due to the fact that both the 
commercial banks and the Federal Reserve act to offset other items and 
both react in the same direction when market interest rates change.28 
The link between member bank borrowing and the existence of reserve 
requirements is obviously close. The cost to a bank of borrowing from the 
Fed is the cost the bank must bear when it fails to meet the reserve require- 
ments through its own resources or through borrowing in the private mar- 
ket. Borrowing thus permits some penalty short of closing down the bank 
to be assessed when reserve requirements are not met.29 
Monetary control should aim to regulate borrowing so as to minimize 
its impact on the money stock. We favor tying the discount rate to some 
money market rate so that it would always be above money market rates 
by some margin. The imposition of a penalty discount rate should be more 
acceptable if the adoption of the other proposals discussed in this paper 
28. The tendency for the latter reactions  to produce procyclical  fluctuations  in the 
money  stock is one of the arguments  favoring  greater  policy  attention  to the money  stock. 
During period B, much of which was characterized  by greater  policy attention to the 
money  stock,  the correlation  between  X4 and X6  was  0.  15,  whereas  for period  A the corre- 
lation was 0.29. 
29. The profit-maximizing  view of bank borrowing  behavior  expressed  in this para- 
graph  has long been  disputed  by those who believe  that banks  borrow  primarily  because 
they get caught  short  as a result  of fluctuations  beyond  their  control.  This opposing  view, 
it seems to us, is based on an incomplete  understanding  of the implications  of profit- 
maximizing  behavior under uncertainty.  For an exposition of this point, see William 
Poole, "Commercial  Bank  Reserve  Management  in a Stochastic  Model: Implications  for 
Monetary  Policy," Journial  of Finance, Vol.  23 (December  1968), pp. 769-91. 320  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
substantially reduce the reserve fluctuations affecting the banking system 
as a whole. Disturbances affecting individual banks, but not the system as 
a whole, can be handled through the interbank federal funds market rather 
than the discount window. If the discount rate were always above money 
market rates, the tendency of borrowing to contribute procyclically to the 
reserve  base would be largely eliminated as would the problems the Federal 
Reserve has in administering the discount window. 
GOVERNMENT  SECURITIES  PORTFOLIO 
The Federal Reserve's government securities portfolio is, of course, the 
principal instrument of monetary policy, but as can be seen from the nega- 
tive covariances in the X6 row of the table, a substantial percentage of open 
market operations is defensive in nature. Indeed, the table understates the 
extent of defensive operations because disturbances  of the type discussed in 
the previous section are also offset to some degree. 
The magnitude of open market operations is substantial. In period B the 
standard deviation of the change in the Fed's government securities port- 
folio was $441 million. The direct costs to the Federal Reserve of this trad- 
ing-the  internal administrative costs  and the yield spreads charged by 
dealers in government securities-as  well as the costs of imperfect mone- 
tary control and greater money market instability could be substantially 
reduced by the proposals examined above. 
Measurement  Error 
Measurement error in the seasonally adjusted money stock consists both 
of error in the underlying unadjusted data and in the seasonal adjustment 
factors applied to them. The importance of data revisions is indicated by 
an analysis of  "preliminary" and  "final" data on the monthly average 
money stock over the  1961-70 period.30 The "preliminary"  figure is the 
first report for a given month in a Federal Reserve Bulletin-for  example, 
the September  figure carried in the October Bulletin. The "final" data were 
30. The analysis  of rates of change of the money stock also uses data for December 
1960,  so that four  quarterly  and twelve  monthly  rate  of change  observations  are available 
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taken from the tables in the articles on the annual revisions of the money 
stock series in the November 1971 and December 1970 Bulletins.31 
Measurement error has great relevance for policy. Suppose, for the sake 
of the present argument, that the preliminary series is regarded as an early 
estimate of the final series, which in turn is regarded as the best possible 
estimate of the "true" series. Since, after all, it is the preliminary series 
that must be used in day-to-day policy management, the question turns on 
how accurately the prelinminary  series predicts the final series. The lower 
the accuracy of the preliminary series, the less reliable the money stock as 
an instrument of monetary policy. 
In the analysis below several techniques are used to compare the pre- 
liminary and final series and to investigate the sources of the diserepancies 
between the two. Since most of the analysis is conducted on rates of change, 
to avoid confusion the term "difference"  has been reserved for the differ- 
ence between the two series (or their respective rates of growth) while the 
term "rate of change" refers  to the difference  between two months (or quar- 
ters) of a given series, always expressed at annual rates. 
The value of the preliminary  rate of growth for predicting the final rate 
is shown by the regression of the second on the first. Using seasonally ad- 
justed data and rates of change over quarterly intervals, the regression has 
a constant term of 1.22, a slope coefficient of only 0.788, an R2 of 0.679, and 
a standard error of 1.33.32  To the extent that the sample period is represen- 
tative, a preliminary rate of growth of, say, 10 percent for a quarter would 
produce a point estimate of the final rate of growth of 1.22 plus 0.788 times 
10.0, or 9.10 percent. However, the standard error implies a one-in-three 
31. Data are  available  earlier  publicly  from  "Federal  Reserve  Statistical  Release H.6" 
(weekly),  and even sooner internally.  Defining  data from the Builletini  as "preliminary" 
was convenient from the point of view of data collection and is fully satisfactory  for 
analyzing  the importance  of revisions.  The quotation  marks  used up to this point remind 
the reader  that  data  are available  even before  the "preliminary"  publication,  and that still 
further  revisions  will most likely  alter  the "final"  figures.  They will be dropped  hereafter, 
however.  It should be noted that the preliminary  rate of growth  series  is computed  from 
the monthly  money  stock  figures  shown in a given  Bulletid,.  For example,  the preliminary 
rate of growth  for September  is calculated  from the August  and September  figures  as re- 
ported in the October BulJletini.  Unless indicated  otherwise,  all rates of growth are ex- 
pressed  at annual  rates.  The rate  of quarterly  growth  is defined  by taking  the  change  in the 
monthly  average  level of the money stock in the last month of the quarter  over the last 
month of the previous  quarter. 
32. The same  regression  with  constant  term  suppressed  has  a coefficient  of 1.018  and a 
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chance that the final rate of growth will be ouitside  the range 7.77 to 10.43 
percent. This range is great enough to warn against strong policy action, for 
example, to slow money growth one quarter  on the grounds that the 10 per- 
cent growth reported for the previous quarter was too high. 
The situation is even worse with respect to rates of monthly change of 
seasonally adjusted data. The regression of final on preliminary has an R2 
of only 0.55; the constant term is 2.32 and the regression coefficient, 0.478. 
With a standard error of 2.40 the predictive value of this regression is ob- 
viously low. 
That the difficulties are caused to a considerable extent by the seasonal 
adjustment is shown by the superiority of the results using unadjusted  data. 
Using quarterly data, the regression of the final on the preliminary rate of 
change has a constant term of 0.53, a regression coefficient of 0.972, an R2 
of 0.989, and a standard error of 1.13. Using monthly unadjusted data, the 
regression yields an R2 of 0.990, a constant term of 0.42, a slope coefficient 
of 0.970, and a standard error of 1.70. 
The seasonally adjusted money stock is, of course, revised to reflect re- 
visions in both the underlying data and the seasonal factors. The relative 
importance of these two sources of revision is indicated by an analysis of 
the time series of differences between final and preliminary  rates of change 
of seasonally adjusted quarterly  data. The variance of this series, 1.99, may 
be divided into three parts: (1) the variance of the difference between the 
final and preliminary  rates of change of unadjusted data, 1.33; (2) the vari- 
ance of the difference between the rates of change of the final and prelimi- 
nary seasonal factors, 1.48; and (3) twice the covariance between the first 
and second, -0.82.33 
According to this evidence, revisions in underlying data and in seasonal 
factors are of roughly equal importance in explaining those in the rate of 
quarterly growth of the seasonally adjusted money stock. When the same 
33.  Algebraically,  if  Yt and yt are, respectively, the final seasonally  adjusted and un- 
adjusted money stock figures, and if Xt and xt are the corresponding  preliminary figures, 
the seasonal factors are S,t  -  yt/ Yt and S,t  = xt/Xt.  Thus, if 
[log  1'  -log  X  A,  [log  -  -log  X]  B,  and 
Flog  -log  ]  1  C, 
(-1)  S_(tg  1) 
then A  B  -  C. By a standard theorem in statistics, Var (A)  -  Var (B)  +  Var (C)  - 
2Cov(B,  C).  (Natural  logarithms  are  used  throughout  since  their first differences  are 
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analysis is performed on rates of monthly change it is found that the dif- 
ference  between the final and the preliminary  rates of change for seasonally 
adjusted  monthly data has a variance of 14.14. Of this variance only 3.17 is 
contributed by the difference  between the final and the preliminary  rates of 
change for seasonally unadjusted  monthly data; 12.21 arises from the differ- 
ence between the final and the preliminary rates of monthly change of sea- 
sonal factors, and -1.24  from the covariance of these two items. The sig- 
nificance of the negative covariance terms will be discussed below. 
If the final series provides a measure of the money stock appropriate for 
policy purposes, the  above  analysis demonstrates that  the  preliminary 
series is far from fully satisfactory. Naturally, the longer the period con- 
sidered, the more accurately will the preliminary rates of growth predict 
the final rates. Furthermore, very short-run fluctuations in money growth 
probably have little impact on aggregate  economic activity. But a real prob- 
lem exists if the growth rate of money over a period as short as three months 
is important, because abnormally high  or low  growth draws responses 
from the financial markets that tend to produce abnormal money growth 
over longer periods.34  In any event, data errors can only complicate mone- 
tary management. 
ERRORS  IN  THE  UNDERLYING  DATA 
For the unadjusted data, a reasonable assumption is that the final series 
is more accurate than the preliminary  series; only the revisions arising from 
definitional changes are sometimes questionable. The most important revi- 
sions in recent years have been connected with the troublesome commercial 
bank account, "cash items in the process of collection." Cash items, and the 
similar  item, "Federal Reserve float," on the books of the Federal Reserve 
System, arise from the check-clearing process and both are deducted from 
gross private demand deposits to obtain the demand deposit component of 
the money stock.35 The measurement problem arises because both cash 
34. The findings discussed above confirm those of an earlier study based on data 
through  the middle  of 1969.  Since  that study  preceded  the 1970  change  in the definition  of 
the money  stock, the findings  here  cannot be ascribed  primarily  to a nonrecurring  defi- 
nitional  change.  For the earlier  study, see William  Poole, "Rules-of-Thumb  for Guiding 
Monetary  Policy," in Open Market  Policies and Operatinig  Procedures-Staff Studies 
(Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, 1971),  pp. 135-89, esp. pp. 176-77. 
35. For the reasons underlying  this treatment,  see, "A New Measure  of the Money 
Supply,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 46 (October 1960), pp. 1108-12. 324  Brookings Papers on Economic.  Activity, 2:1972 
items and float incorporate some transactions not associated with private 
demand deposits; deducting all cash items and float thereby introduces a 
downward bias into the money stock series.36 
Measurement error due to cash items connected with, first, Eurodollar 
borrowing and, second, the activities of agencies and branches of foreign 
banks operating in the United States and of subsidiaries of U.S. banks or- 
ganized under the Edge Act, was found to be important in 1969 and 1970, 
and led to substantial revisions in the money stock series in those years.37 
Perhaps in part because of the practical impossibility of separating cash 
items and float into the categories that should and should not be deducted 
from gross deposits, the money stock concept itself was changed at the 
time of the 1970 revision to include the liabilities of foreign agencies and 
Edge Act corporations. As cash items and float shrink in the future through 
changes in Federal Reserve regulations and improvements in data pro- 
cessing facilities, the effect is likely to be a reduction of current downward 
biases and therefore an overstatement of  rates of growth of the money 
stock. 
Another important source of measurement  error is the estimation of non- 
member bank deposits. Reports from nonmember banks are available only 
twice a year on call dates; between call dates data are estimated on the as- 
sumption that, after adjusting for trend, these deposits are a constant frac- 
tion of the deposits of country member banks. The problem is growing 
worse. According to  data from December call dates, nonmember banks 
accounted for  16 percent of total demand deposits adjusted in  1947; by 
1961 the ratio had risen to 18 percent, and it rose to 24 percent in 1971. 
As some measure of the seriousness of the problem, the revisions of the 
money stock arising from the call date information have a standard devia- 
tion  of $379 million as calculated from the twenty-three call dates from 
June 1960 through June 1971. This standard deviation is about 1.4 percent 
of average nonmember bank demand deposits over this period. Since the 
call dates are six months apart, the standard deviation of the estimation 
36. The problem  would not, of course, arise if money were defined  to include  gross 
deposits  rather  than deposits  net of cash items  and float. While  definitional  problems  are 
beyond  the scope of this study,  this particular  problem  would be eliminated  by the reduc- 
tion in cash items and float that is desirable  on other grounds  in any case. 
37. See "Revision  of Money Supply  Series,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 55 (Octo- 
ber 1969), pp. 787-803; and, "Revision  of the Money Stock," Federcal  Reserve  Buxlletin, 
Vol. 56 (December 1970), pp. 887-909. Edge Act subsidiaries  engage in international 
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errors amounts to an annual rate of about 2.8 percent of nonmember bank 
deposits, or of about 0.6 percent with respect to total commercial bank de- 
mand deposits at the present time. 
Although the error of 0.6 percent at annual rate seems small, the non- 
member bank error is a significant portion of the total measurement error 
affecting the unadjusted data. It will be recalled that the regression of the 
final on the preliminary  rate of quarterly  change using unadjusted  data has 
a standard error of  1.13. The errors generated by the tardy data on non- 
member banks are growing and must be reduced eventually if monetary 
control is to become more precise. 
ERRORS  IN  SEASONAL  ADJUSTMENT 
While the revisions of the underlying data generally can be accepted as 
improving accuracy, it is an open question whether the final seasonal fac- 
tors are more accurate than the preliminary ones. The revisions occur be- 
cause the method of seasonal adjustment-the  Census X-1  1 program plus 
"professional review" by  Federal Reserve statisticians-determines  the 
seasonal factor using data for several years before and, when available, 
after the month in question. Of course, none of the "after" data are avail- 
able when the preliminary  series is constructed but as time passes the addi- 
tional data enter calculations of revised seasonal factors for the final series. 
The most important analytical point to be made is that the seasonal ad- 
justment of variables controlled by policy must be carefully distinguished 
from that of variables that are not controlled. The aim of seasonal adjust- 
ment of data on noncontrolled variables is to eliminate recurrent  seasonal 
patterns so that cyclical and other patterns may be more easily identified. 
But seasonal patterns of policy-controlled variables result from what the 
policy makers do. For a noncontrolled variable, the problem is optimal 
estimation of  seasonal factors; for a controlled variable the problem is 
optimal determination. 
This point is relevant because the 1970 policy shift involving heavier em- 
phasis on the money stock relative to interest rates has not been accom- 
panied by any change in the seasonal adjustment  procedure. Under current 
procedures, the selection of seasonal factors for the money stock is equiva- 
lent to the selection of a seasonal policy. Such policy in one year ought not 
to hinge, for example, on a change in policy the previous year that X-1  1 
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dentally) spurred money growth in the first half of a year and then re- 
strained it in the second, the seasonal factors calculated by X-1  1 for the 
next year would be affected. Whether or not there were any reason in the 
second year to make unadjusted money growth higher in the first half and 
lower in the second half, the use of the standard seasonal factors would 
tend to produce this result. 
This problem is  not  simply hypothetical.  Seasonally adjusted money 
growth was higher in the first half than in the second half of both 1970 and 
1971. The ex post revisions of the seasonal factors will bring the growth 
rates in the two halves of each year closer together than originally reported. 
That the seasonal factors do change is indicated by the following table, 
which shows the growth rates38  for the first and second halves of 1970 cal- 
culated from the preliminary and revised data on the seasonally adjusted 
money stock, as reported by the January 1971 and November 1971 issues 
of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
1970 
Issue  First half  Second half 
January 1971 Bulletin  6.0%  4.8% 
November  1971  Bulletin  5.7  5.3 
The seasonally adjusted money stock series reported in the January 1972 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  shows growth rates of 10.2 and 2.4 percent, respec- 
tively, for the first and second halves of 1971. The disparity between these 
rates will probably narrow in the  annual revision of  the  annual money 
stock series to be published in the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  in the fall of 1972. 
These revised seasonal factors ought not to be mechanically incorporated 
into policy making in 1973. 
The Federal Reserve should, at the end of each year, explicitly decide the 
seasonal policy for the next. This policy can be most conveniently expressed 
in terms of a set of seasonal factors, which will allow stabilization decisions 
to be made in terms of the resulting seasonally adjusted money stock. The 
same seasonal factors would be used in constructing the final money stock 
series since they describe the current seasonal policy. The fact that such 
seasonal factors would in general differ from those produced by the X-1  1 
program is irrelevant. 
38. Continuously  compounded  annual  rates  of growth  from December  1969  to June 
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One side effect of the use of predetermined  seasonal factors would be a 
less smooth final money stock series. The negative covariance between revi- 
sions in the underlying  data and in the seasonal factors is one manifestation 
of the smoothing performed by the X-1  1 technique. If revision of the under- 
lying data tend to produce an outlier, revision of the seasonal factor for 
that observation tends to eliminate it. The overall extent of smoothing is in- 
dicated by the fact that the variance of the rate of quarterly change of the 
final series is 5.48 percent, while the variance of the preliminary  seasonally 
adjusted rate of quarterly change series is 6.07 percent; the corresponding 
figures for rates of monthly change are 12.79 and 30.97, respectively, for 
final and preliminary. Smoothing through revision of seasonal factors is 
also the reason why the slope coefficients in the regressions reported above 
of final on preliminary rates of change are so far below unity. 
That smoothing pure and simple is involved is suggested by the seasonal 
factors for the money stock over the postwar period. They yield no evidence 
of major changes in M1 seasonals except for the shift of the tax date from 
March 15 to April 15 in 1955. To support the changing seasonals model it 
would be necessary to show, for example, that the seasonal factors com- 
puted by X-1  1 have a recognizable trend. Instead, as shown in Figures 1 
and 2, the fluctuations in the money stock seasonals appear to have occurred 
in a narrow range and to have served primarily to smooth the final sea- 
sonally adjusted series. 
Smoothing may well be justified insofar as the purpose of seasonal ad- 
justment is to obtain the best possible estimate of the trend-cycle  component 
of a series. For this purpose it does not really matter how much of the re- 
mainder of the series is called "seasonal" and how much "irregular."  Thus 
the final seasonally adjusted money stock may be a very satisfactory esti- 
mate of the trend-cycle component, plus random noise that may consist of 
"smoothed irregular."3'9  But an unsmoothed series seems more desirable to 
avoid the incorporation of irregular  components into seasonal factors and 
to permit the analyst to smooth according to his own purposes. 
The argument for smoothing the money stock is that one outlier-even 
several-is  no cause for concern. This point of view, however, should find 
39. This argument  is our interpretation  of recent  work on the theory  of seasonal  ad- 
justment. See D. M. Grether  and M. Nerlove, "Some Properties  of 'Optimal'  Seasonal 
Adjustment,"  Econiometrica,  Vol. 38 (September  1970), pp. 682-703; Marc Nerlove, 
"Spectral  Analysis of Seasonal Adjustment  Procedures,"  Econiometrica,  Vol. 32 (July 
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expression in the way policy reacts to outliers rather than in the way the 
data are reported. Outliers are frequently  signals that something is happen- 
ing that requires  remedial  action; they ought to be investigated rather than 
artificially smoothed away; one of the dangers of the X-1 1 model is that 
outliers are all too easily explained away by a superficial  appeal to changing 
seasonals. 
The realization that most  of  the revisions in seasonal factors for the 
money stock  are connected with smoothing actually makes the task of 
policy determination  somewhat easier. Since the factors have changed rela- 
tively little in the past, seasonal goals should be readily achievable once they 
are established. Unfortunately, little work has been done on this question. 
Tentatively, we conclude that efficient resource allocation requires the 
monetary authorities to eliminate seasonality in interest rates arising from 
seasonality in the demand for money, while giving full scope to seasonality 
in  interest rates arising from that  in aggregate demand. Seasonal fluc- 
tuations in interest rates arising from the arbitrary  selection of tax dates can 
serve no useful function, while those arising from the Christmas shopping 
season may tend to reallocate demand and production into slack seasons. 
In terms of the simple Keynesian model of the economy, monetary policy 
should remove seasonality from the LM  function but not  counter sea- 
sonality in the IS function. 
Until  the full  analysis of  optimal seasonality for  monetary policy  is 
worked out, a freeze on the money stock seasonal factors at current values 
probably would be desirable. As can be seen from Figure 2 and Table 2, 
these factors have not changed dramatically in recent years; rather they 
have tended to cluster around the factors computed by a version of  the 
X-1 1 program that generates fixed seasonal factors, using data for the 
1955-71 period. 
This inherited pattern of money stock seasonals, however, is associated 
with substantial interest rate seasonals, as the last column of Table 2 sug- 
gests. This amount of seasonality in interest rates is not surprising: Federal 
Reserve policy over this period generally  sought to damp interest rate move- 
ments-both  cyclical and seasonal-except  when it deliberately aimed at 
pushing interest rates one way or the other. Thus, a seasonal pattern re- 
mained because movements in rates were damped rather than eliminated. 
Further analysis may show that either more or less interest rate sea- 
sonality would be optimal. Some insight into the magnitudes can be gained 
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Table 2.  Seasonal Factors for Money Stock and Treasury  Bill Rate, 
1955-71 Period 
Fixed ffctors 
(estimated  1955-71) 
Vartiaible  ftictors.fbr  Thlree-mouith 
fin1acl  mouiey  stock  Moniey  Treasury 
Mont/i  (ranige  over 1961-71)  stock  bill raite 
January  102.3-103.0  102.5  104.8 
February  99.0-100.0  99.8  100.0 
March  99.0-  99.2  99.1  96.0 
April  100.0-100.6  100.3  95.7 
May  98.0-  98.6  98.4  94.0 
June  98.6-  99.2  99.1  95.2 
July  99.0-  99.4  99.2  94.3 
August  98.4-  98.7  98.7  99.3 
September  99.3-  99.5  99.4  103.2 
October  99.9-100.3  100.0  104.6 
November  100.8-101.0  100.8  105.3 
December  102.8-103.0  102.7  107.5 
Sources: Samiie  as for Figures 1 anid  2. 
that would occur if money seasonality were eliminated, and vice versa. 
These calculations rely on estimates of the interest elasticity of the demand 
for money and estimates of the money stock and bill rate seasonals. Studies 
reviewed by Laidler suggest an interest elasticity of demand for M1 with re- 
spect to the short rate of interest of -0.17  to -0.20.4"  Since maximum and 
minimum money stock seasonals are currently about 3 percent above and 
2 percent below the yearly average, respectively, in the absence of money 
seasonals the interest  elasticity estimates would imply interest rate seasonals 
of  five to  six times this amount in  addition to  the seasonality already 
present. For a Treasury  bill rate averaging 5 percent over the year, the addi- 
tional seasonal fluctuation would range between 0.75 to 0.90 percentage 
point above, and two-thirds of this amount below, the 5.0 percent average. 
Eliminating the interest rate seasonal would require widening the range of 
the money stock seasonal 1.2-1.5 percent at the high end and 1.0-1.2 per- 
cent at the low end. These estimates of the increased seasonality in one 
series resulting from eliminating that in the other are by no means insig- 
nificant, but neither are they large relative to the cyclical variability in the 
two. 
40. DavidE. W. Laidler,  TlheDeand/ber.JorMonley.  Tleoriestand Evide,ice(Inlterniationial 
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In sum, should elimination of seasonals from either the money stock or 
the bill rate be deemed desirable to promote economic efficiency, no prac- 
tical diffiCulty  should arise in doing So.41 
To promote clear policy analysis, the Federal Reserve should select each 
year a set of factors to represent the seasonal aspects of monetary policy. 
With this approach, the rate of money growth can in principle be divided 
into four parts: (a) growth for long-run needs and for cyclical stabilization; 
(b) growth for seasonal stabilization; (c) growth in response to short-run, 
unpredictable  developments in the financial markets; and (d) random, un- 
intended growth due to the inevitable errors in reaching policy targets and 
in the underlying data. The preliminary and final seasonal factors for the 
money stock would always be identical. Decisions on seasonal policy would 
be explicit and they would be made by the Federal Reserve rather  than by a 
computer program. 
Summary 
As the arguments favoring increased policy attention to the money stock 
have gained acceptance, the ability of the Federal Reserve to control the 
money stock has become a more prominent issue. The simple theoretical 
model presented  earlier  in this paper demonstrates that imprecise monetary 
control tends to aggravate the instability of both income and interest rates. 
In order to present a broad view of the control problem an effort has been 
made to analyze all of the major sources of control errors and construct as 
comprehensive a list of reforms as possible. While analysis has been con- 
centrated on the technical aspects of the proposed reforms, it must be rec- 
ognized that implementation of reform must await analysis of  the entire 
range of economic effects of the reforms. Since extremely accurate control 
seems possible within the present institutional framework,  the proposed re- 
forms do not go outside it. For example, in designing reforms, we have 
41. Several  studies  have found substantially  lower interest  elasticities  of demand  for 
money than those discussed by Laidler.  An estimate as low as -0.05  would point to 
interest  rate seasonals  in the absence  of money  stock seasonals  of about four times those 
discussed in the text. Especially  in the seasonal  context, these low estimates  seem im- 
plausible  for a variety  of reasons.  Nevertheless,  they suggest  that a transition  period  is in 
order  if seasonals  are taken out of the money stock in order  to test the reactions  in the 
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ignored the fact that a system of  100 percent reserve requirements would 
eliminate disturbances arising from fractional reserve banking, and that 
freely flexible foreign exchange rates would protect the domestic money 
stock from foreign influences. 
The improvement of monetary control calls for separate reforms no one 
of which can, by itself, solve the control problem. And so, in the order of 
the discussion in the paper, here is the reform shopping list: 
(1)  Eliminate reserve  requirements  against Treasury  deposits in commer- 
cial banks. 
(2)  Require all nonmember banks to adhere to the Federal Reserve re- 
serve requirements  specified for member banks. 
(3)  If M1 is accepted without qualification as the definition of money 
for policy purposes, eliminate reserve requirements on time and savings 
deposits. 
(4)  Abandon lagged reserve requirements in favor of contemporaneous 
reserve requirements. 
(5)  Amend regulations and invest in additional data processing equip- 
ment to reduce Federal Reserve float to the greatest extent possible. 
(6)  Change the treatment of vault cash in the reserve requirements so 
that only a percentage, equaling the marginal reserve requirement on de- 
mand deposits for each bank, is allowed as reserves. 
(7)  Set the discount rate so that it is always above money market rates of 
interest, and end administrative  control over member bank borrowing. 
(8)  Until item (2) is implemented, require all nonmember banks to fur- 
nish deposit and vault cash data to the Federal Reserve more frequently. 
(9)  Determine seasonal factors for the money stock as an expression of 
the seasonal aspects of mnonetary  policy rather than by standard seasonal 
adjustment techniques. Since these seasonal factors would define seasonal 
monetary policy they would not be subject to later revision. Comments  and 
Discussion 
David Fand: The Poole and Lieberman  paper, "Improving Monetary Con- 
trol," offers a menu of recommended changes to improve the implementa- 
tion of monetary policy. This informed and timely analysis of our present 
complicated reserve  requirements  suggests that our banking laws and regu- 
lations  were not  designed to  facilitate monetary control;  indeed,  until 
recently, the money stock was not considered among the primary objec- 
tives  of  monetary policy. The inherited system of  reserve requirements 
complicates the relation between reserves and deposits and necessitates 
"defensive" operations. Poole and Lieberman make an excellent case for 
reforms to improve the central bank's control of money. 
I have three specific comments on the paper. I wonder whether  a "domes- 
tic" money concept-the  official money stock less dollar balances held by 
foreigners or other central banks-should  not receive more consideration. 
"Domestic" money-that  is, money available for the purchase  of goods and 
services in the United States-may  be more relevant for analyzing Ameri- 
can economic activity than the official series. One recent attempt to calcu- 
late domestic money suggests that its movements may not coincide with the 
official money series. 
Poole and Lieberman  assume that lagged reserve  requirements  may inter- 
fere with monetary control. This is certainly a plausible hypothesis, but not 
self-evident, since it does depend on bank portfolio behavior. It would be 
desirable, therefore, to  investigate its effects on monetary control. Some 
very preliminary  studies for the Canadian money supply suggest that lagged 
reserve requirements  do not appear to lessen monetary control. 
The paper utilizes supply of, and demand for, reserves  as a framework  to 
outline changes that would improve monetary control. But it may be de- 
sirable to cast this analysis in terms of a money supply function (or a money 
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multiplier  framework)  in order  to consider systematically  all the factors that 
affect the money stock. 
This paper on "improving money stock control" also reveals the dis- 
tance traversed in the past decade. At such a session ten years ago, the 
paper would have focused on whether there was any point to controlling 
money. The Fed, it was argued, can control banks, but not intermediaries; 
and its actions to restrict bank deposits were neutralized by offsetting ex- 
pansion of intermediary  claims. Our experience in the 1960s suggests that 
tight credit may have an even more restrictive  effect on the intermediaries; 
hence, the concern with disintermediation.  Perhaps  because of the accelerat- 
ing inflation, we are now discussing the mechanics of controlling money 
and relatively less its possible futility. 
A frequent question is why so very few countries and central banks have 
attempted to control the money stock, and the suggestion is that such con- 
trol is either undesirable or impossible. I question this conclusion and sug- 
gest that governments have not focused on controlling money because it is, 
historically speaking, a relatively new issue of policy. 
Monetary policy as one of the main tools in stabilization policy is a sub- 
ject that developed after World War I. The mechanics of central banking, 
such as the effect of open market operations on bank reserves, was not dis- 
covered until the 1920s, and was certainly not understood at the time that 
the Federal Reserve System was first set up. And the Federal Reserve was 
expected to provide an elastic currency  and to facilitate the legitimate needs 
of business, but not to control the money stock. 
During the twenties the Federal Reserve, in its famous Tenth  Annual  Re- 
port, defined its primary  role to accommodate commerce and business; and 
emphasized its responsibilities for credit policy rather than money. The 
Federal Reserve partially  accepted a real-bills view of central banking. Dur- 
ing the controversies surrounding price level stabilization in the 1920s, the 
Fed objected to having a price stability objective written into the Federal 
Reserve Act. 
After the Great Depression, money was assumed to have very little im- 
pact on economic activity, and only after the monetary revival in the 1950s 
did monetary policy begin to receive any real attention. Thus, it is only in 
the last decade that the question of controlling money has been perceived  as 
a central banking issue. 
Central banking history in the United  States reveals two distinct ap- 
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bank in terms of the legitimate needs of business and orderly credit mar- 
kets; the otlier, in terms of the macroeconomic effects of changes in de- 
posits.  If the bankers' approach emphasizes "accommodation" and the 
credit aspects of central banking, the economists' approach emphasizes 
"control" and the monetary effects of central banking. 
The recent changes in the Federal Open Market Committee directive 
from a relative emphasis on money market conditions to the aggregates can 
be traced back to the accommodation and control approaches that first 
surfaced in the 1920s. This issue does not involve monetarism and fiscalism, 
but relates to  the "quantitative" and "qualitative" approaches, or what 
Lauchlin Currie called  "the monetary theory  vs.  the  commercial loan 
theory of banking."' The influence of economists on central banking policy 
has become more significant in the last decade, and they tend to favor the 
control over the accommodation view. This is perhaps one  reason why 
the monetary aspects of central banking are currently receiving more em- 
phasis, and why the money stock control question was not on the policy 
agenda until very recently. 
In conclusion, let me emphasize that the role of money stock control in 
stabilization policy is far from settled. That better control of money is de- 
sirable is not really in dispute but this does not tell us the extent to which 
our stabilization performance may thereby be improved. This, in my opin- 
ion, is the important question for the future. 
Stephen M. Goldfeld: I found the Poole-Lieberman paper interesting and 
stimulating. I would like to compliment the authors especially for attacking 
such a broad range of issues. Indeed, in terms of policy recommendations 
per square inch, it outdistances any other paper that I have read recently. 
In the first part of the paper, Poole's earlier model is extended to the case 
in which monetary control is imperfect rather than precise. The authors il- 
lustrate well the consequences of that slippage and show that it creates the 
presumption that improved control of the money supply increases the sta- 
bility of income and interest rates. That presumption becomes the key rule 
of the game for the rest of the paper. 
Of necessity, however, that simple aggregate model cannot tell us how 
best to control money or how much we can gain by controlling it better. 
1. Lauchlin  Currie,  The  Supply  and Conatrol  of Moniey  in the Uniited  States (Harvard 
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Hence  the paper  has to step outside  the model  to support  and evaluate  its 
recommendations;  it does so in terms  of a variety  of more  or less separate 
and  unintegrated  considerations.  For  example,  the benefits  of the proposals 
to remove  reserve  requirements  on time deposits  and government  deposits 
are  evaluated  by analyzing  the variance  of total reserves  and then  examin- 
ing the variance  of required  reserves  on various  types of deposits,  taking 
proper  account  of all  the  covariances.  These  calculations  are  above  question 
and they are illuminating.  But they are nonetheless  subject to different 
interpretations. 
I can offer  several  reasons  why one should  be cautious  in treating  these 
calculations  as indicative  of the gains  from  implementing  these  proposals. 
First, eliminating  reserve  requirements  on time deposits, for example, 
would  not necessarily  generate  the benefits  that Poole and Lieberman  cite, 
because  banks  might  well hold some reserves  against  these  deposits  volun- 
tarily  and  hence  keep  the  effective  reserve  ratio  on time  deposits  above  zero. 
Second,  to the extent  that the Federal  Reserve  deliberately  offsets  devia- 
tions  in government  deposits  or time  deposits  with  open market  operations 
or other  actions,  no instability  is transmitted  to the money  supply.  The co- 
variances  shed  some  light  on the  extent  to which  such  an offset  took place  in 
the sample period, but they are not conclusive  evidence.  As Poole and 
Lieberman  themselves  point  out,  part  of the  predictable  variation  that  could 
have  been  offset  by the Federal  Reserve  might,  indeed,  simply  have  been  al- 
lowed to occur  as a deliberate  choice of a convenient  way of conducting 
monetary  policy.  For example,  if government  deposits  were  changing  in the 
right  direction  and that helped  to move the money stock in the desired 
manner,  the policy  makers  might  simply  have let the change  happen  with- 
out offsetting  it. To make  judgments  on the importance  of various  types  of 
disturbances,  one ideally  needs  to know  how well  the Federal  Reserve  pre- 
dicted  them over the sample  period  and, given that prediction,  how they 
consciously  acted  to allow  or prevent  them  from  occurring.  Obviously  that 
kind  of knowledge  is not available,  but results  obtained  without  it must  be 
interpreted  with  care. 
In their  variance  analysis,  the authors  choose  a weekly  period  as the time 
unit.  There  is no way  to defend  (or to criticize)  that choice  because  there  is 
no consistent  theoretical  model  to guide  such  a choice.  The  weekly  variance 
presumably  assumes  that policy  makers  should  attempt  to control  money 
on a weekly  basis,  but  nothing  in the  paper  gives  us any  reason  to prefer  that 
over a daily or monthly  criterion.  And the differences  in the empirical  re- 340  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
sults might be large if the calculations were performed on different time 
units. 
Controlling the money supply is obviously not the authors' only policy 
objective. If it were, Poole and Lieberman would not merely recommend 
the abolition of reserve requirements  on time deposits, but would go to the 
extreme position of applying a 100 percent reserve requirement  on demand 
deposits-a  reform  that would clearly make the money stock subject to per- 
fect control. I infer that the authors would not be enthusiastic about certain 
changes in the structure of the financial system that would follow from 100 
percent reserve requirements.  Neither would I. A different kind of world 
would prevail with 100 percent reserves  and in that world the control of the 
money supply might be less relevant and less interesting. 
The proposal for abolition of reserve requirements  on time deposits is a 
more relevant and reasonable proposal; but, by the same token, it also 
would alter the structure of the financial system as well as contributing to 
improved control of the money stock. In evaluating the Poole-Lieberman 
proposal, I would feel more confident if I had a clearer view of the likely 
impacts on the financial structure and, in turn, on economic stability. My 
concern can be illustrated  with one specific example: If the reserve require- 
ment on time deposits were lowered to zero, the banks would become able 
and willing to increase interest payments on time deposits, given any set of 
interest rates on short-term  securities. Presumably  the interest rate on time 
deposits would move up relative to market interest rates and would move 
more nearly parallel to  them thereafter. Depending on the relative im- 
portance of time deposit rates and market interest rates as determinants of 
the demand for money, the interest elasticity of the demand for money 
would be changed. It is not clear whether such changes would facilitate or 
impede economic stability, but certainly that issue should  be evaluated 
along with the benefits  of improved monetary  control. Another side effect of 
dropping reserve  requirements  on time deposits would be the strengthening 
of the competitive position and profitability  of commercial banks relative  to 
other intermediaries. This may be a  minor issue;  but it  deserves some 
consideration. 
I understand  why the authors want to focus solely on the objective of im- 
proving monetary control; but the point I want to emphasize is that they 
cannot really abstract from all other considerations, and in fact they do not 
do so consistently. The accuracy of monetary control is not the only inter- 
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proved monetary control and the  possible costs  of  implementing more 
precise controls are important. These added tasks require a much more 
comprehensive and elaborate model of the economy than the authors or 
anyone else now has available; I hope that Poole and Lieberman  will con- 
tribute further  to our knowledge by moving in that direction in the future. 
General  Discussion 
F. Thomas Juster emphasized the importance of the span of time over 
which the money supply deviates from the target. The cost of imperfect  con- 
trol of money has to be negligible over time periods of an hour or a day, 
Juster  observed, but obviously becomes sizable over some longer, meaning- 
ful span of time. He doubted that the relevant period was as short as a week, 
as the paper implicitly assumed by studying the variance of weekly observa- 
tions. On the other hand, Juster felt that very short-run swings in interest 
rates could be costly. 
In a similar vein, Franco Modigliani reported that James Pierce of the 
Federal  Reserve Board staff had found that the particular  profile of a inoney 
supply path obtained over a six-month period has little lasting effect there- 
after. In other words, the economic and financial impact from the third 
quarter  on will be very much the same regardless  of whether a given money 
increase  in the first  two quarters  was generated  by smooth growth or uneven 
growth within those quarters. Although Modigliani cautioned that these 
findings were tentative, he suggested that they reinforced Goldfeld's and 
Juster's comments on the need to determine the relevant time period for 
monetary  control before definite conclusions are reached on the desirability 
of major institutional reforms. 
William Poole explained his use of weekly data, noting that Federal Re- 
serve regulations  cover weekly activities and hence data are generated on a 
weekly  basis. He understood  the concern about the relevant  time period, but 
he emphasized that the paper addressed a different set of questions. The 
present  institutional  structure  of banking has been developed over decades; 
virtually no attention has ever been given to the ways that structure im- 
pedes or facilitates  monetary  control. The empirical work in the paper cata- 
logs the nature and sources of the problems of controlling money, as they 
relate to the institutional structure. Documenting the sources of weekly 
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weekly basis, Poole emphasized. He did feel that, if the money stock fluctu- 
ated, it should do so  for a good  reason-such  as a conscious desire to 
smooth interest rate movements or to stimulate the economy-and  not be- 
cause of mistakes or unforeseen shifts. Charles Lieberman  added that, from 
an eclectic point of view, those who emphasize the importance of interest 
rate fluctuations should favor reforms  to reduce the impact on interest rates 
of money supply disturbances. Also,  since private financial and business 
executives watch the movements of the money stock closely as indicators of 
economic  activity and of  Federal Reserve policy, erratic fluctuations in 
these variables can destabilize economic expectations and behavior. 
John Kareken agreed that the authors presented a strong case that the 
adoption of their reforms would contribute to the stability of  GNP.  By 
cutting the variance of the money stock for a given volume of reserves, the 
reforms should also reduce the variance in GNP  for a given stock of re- 
serves. But Kareken felt that, unless and until these reforms were made, the 
presence of "banking disturbances" really argued for exercising short-run 
monetary control through the federal funds rate rather than through the 
stock of reserves. 
Stephen Goldfeld questioned the conclusion of Lieberman and Kareken 
on the contribution of the reforms  to economic stability. He contended that 
the effect on the variation of income was ambiguous, and only quantitative 
examination of all the factors involved could resolve the issue. 
Kareken also reinforced  the authors' criticisms of lagging reserve require- 
ments. The lagged requirement was initiated by the Federal Reserve for 
two quite different reasons: to attract a larger membership of commercial 
banks into the system and to ease the task of hitting a free reserve target. 
However, now that free reserves receive less attention from the monetary 
authorities, Kareken saw little reason for keeping the lagged system. Simi- 
larly, Modigliani agreed with Poole and Lieberman  that the reserve  require- 
ments on Treasury deposits should be abolished. But he and several of the 
panel concluded that further study would be required before the reserve 
requirement on time deposits should be changed or eliminated. 